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Bitget から約3億8,750万ドル流出:秘密鍵は盗まれず、署名承認に渡る「取引データ」が偽装された
2026.09.25
Incident
Security

About $387.5 Million Leaves Bitget Without a Stolen Key: The Transaction Data Fed to the Signing Approval Was Spoofed

Crypto exchange Bitget detected unauthorized transfers from its hot and warm wallets on September 24, 2026. It later revised the loss from $351.6 million to $387.5 million (about ¥60.93 billion). The CEO says the attacker compromised a backend system in the wallet infrastructure, spoofed transaction data, and caused the approval process to move funds out. She has ruled out a private key compromise. Strict key management does not help if nothing independently verifies what is being approved before it is signed. This is a case for auditing the approval path of your own custody and withdrawal systems. A formal root-cause report had not been published as of September 26.

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Meter で「ブロック検証の欠陥」から担保なしの MTR/MTRG が発行され、Passport ブリッジ経由で BNB Chain に流出:ブリッジの安全性は送金元チェーンの検証を超えられない
2026.09.23
Incident
Bridge

A "Block Validation Flaw" on Meter Mints Unbacked MTR and MTRG That Leak to BNB Chain via Passport: A Bridge Can Be No Safer Than the Source Chain's Validation

Meter, an EVM-compatible L1, said on September 24, 2026 that an attacker had exploited a "block validation flaw" from 21:14 UTC the previous day. The attacker minted unbacked MTR and MTRG, dumped them on DEXs, and bridged funds out. Mainnet and the Passport bridge are paused. According to Blockaid, about $2.3 million of unbacked wrapped MTRG was minted on BNB Chain in roughly two transactions. The starting point appears to be the source chain accepting an invalid state, not a flaw in the bridge's own code. No detailed post-mortem has been published. Any system that accepts deposits from external chains should decide now how it will handle a source-chain rollback or invalidation reaching its own ledger.

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【続報】Solana Alpenglow がテストネットとデブネットで稼働、「9月28日」はメインネット有効化日ではなかった:commitment の統合と投票トランザクションの消滅に備える
2026.09.22
Solana
Validator

[Follow-up] Solana's Alpenglow Is Live on Testnet and Devnet, and "September 28" Was Never Its Mainnet Date: Prepare for Merged Commitment Levels and Vanishing Vote Transactions

Anza switched consensus from TowerBFT to Alpenglow (Votor) on Solana testnet on September 24, 2026 and on devnet on September 25. The mainnet date remains unannounced, "after our observation period." Alpenglow moves votes out of blocks. As a result, `confirmed` and `finalized` become the same thing, and vote transactions, which made up more than half of daily mainnet transactions, disappear from blocks. A single slot may also carry more than one candidate block. RPC, indexing and analytics teams should now use devnet to test commitment settings, transaction-count baselines and slot-keyed buffering before the mainnet migration.

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DCENT App Wallet の旧版で署名したアドレスが一斉に流出:6,678ウォレットから1,175万 XRP、パッチでは消えない「鍵の履歴」
2026.09.17
Incident
Security

Addresses Signed With Old DCENT App Wallet Versions Drained at Scale: 11.75 Million XRP From 6,678 Wallets, and a Key History That No Patch Can Erase

DCENT, the wallet brand of Korea's IoTrust, announced unauthorized transfers from its software "App Wallet" on September 16, 2026. According to XRPL.to, about 11.75 million XRP left 6,678 wallets between September 15 and 20. The company's impact criteria have three parts: the recovery phrase was entered into the App Wallet; the address has a signing history, meaning transfers or approvals; and that signing happened on a version earlier than 8.1.0. The technical cause has not been disclosed. Taken together, the criteria mean that updating the app does not remove the risk to keys already used. The only remedy is to generate new keys from a new recovery phrase and move the assets.

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Circle の Arc がパブリックメインネットを公開:USDC をガスにした許可型 L1 が EVM 互換の前提を崩す箇所(18桁と6桁の二重表現、WETH の不在)
2026.09.16
Stablecoin
Blockchain Infrastructure

Circle Opens Arc Public Mainnet: Where a Permissioned L1 With USDC Gas Breaks EVM-Compatibility Assumptions (18 vs 6 Decimals, No WETH)

On September 16, 2026, Circle opened the public mainnet of Arc, an EVM-compatible L1 whose native gas asset is USDC. Twelve institutions, including Circle, run the validators, and the Tendermint-derived Malachite BFT provides deterministic finality. USDC on Arc is one balance with two interfaces. The native side counts in 18 decimals; the ERC-20 side (0x3600…0000) counts in 6. There is no WETH-style wrapper. The assumption that "EVM-compatible means existing code just works" breaks most easily in how amounts are handled. Integrators evaluating Arc should confirm three things against live node queries, not documentation tables, before integrating: decimal conversion boundaries, double-counted balances and history, and routing through WETH.

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【続報】Glamsterdam の Sepolia フォークが10月6日 13:53:36 UTC(エポック353024)で確定:Devnet-11 で初の安定移行、「エポック351232」の食い違いも解消
2026.09.15
Ethereum
Ethereum Improvement Proposals

[Follow-up] Glamsterdam's Sepolia Fork Locked for 2026-10-06 13:53:36 UTC (Epoch 353024): First Clean Transition on Devnet-11, and the "Epoch 351232" Mismatch Explained

Ethereum core developers have confirmed that Glamsterdam will activate on the Sepolia testnet at 13:53:36 UTC on October 6, 2026 (epoch 353024, timestamp 1791294816). On September 16, Glamsterdam-Devnet-11 completed a fork transition with no drop in participation, the first time this has happened. The "epoch 351232" figure that circulated in coverage belongs to the earlier September 28 proposal. The correct epoch for October 6 is 353024, which resolves the date mismatch this series flagged last time. Organizations running nodes, L2s or indexers on Sepolia should, this week (about nine days before the fork), identify client versions that include the Sepolia schedule on both EL and CL and lock in their upgrade plan. Hoodi and mainnet dates remain unset.

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【続報】Ethereum と Base のネイティブ・アカウント抽象化の統一協議が決裂:EIP-8141 と EIP-8130 は別々の規格として進み、ウォレットは二系統の実装を迫られる
2026.09.14
Account Abstraction
Ethereum

[Follow-up] Ethereum and Base Abandon Effort to Unify Native Account Abstraction: EIP-8141 and EIP-8130 Proceed as Separate Standards, and Wallets Will Have to Implement Both

The authors of Ethereum L1's EIP-8141 (Frame Transactions) and the Base-led EIP-8130 had been working toward a common standard for both chains. The talks ended in the second week of September 2026, as Ethlabs developer Derek Chiang announced on September 14. The split came from diverging priorities, not a technical dead end. Ethereum prioritizes censorship resistance, privacy and security; Base prioritizes scale, customization and compliance. If both ship as planned, native AA transaction formats will differ between L1 and Base. Wallet, SDK and signing-infrastructure teams should start designing an abstraction layer on the assumption that they will handle two native formats on top of ERC-4337 and EIP-7702.

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Base、Cobalt で EIP-8130 のネイティブAAを投入予定——バンドラもEntryPointも使わず、ERC-4337比でUSDC送金ガスを63.2%削減
2026.09.03
Account Abstraction
Ethereum

Base plans native account abstraction in Cobalt — EIP-8130 drops bundlers and EntryPoint, cutting USDC transfer gas 63.2% against ERC-4337

Base has published plans to bring account abstraction into the protocol itself with EIP-8130 in its next network upgrade, Cobalt. Accounts register who may act for them and how signatures are validated in an onchain system contract, and the chain validates every transaction against that configuration — no alternate mempool, no bundlers, no EntryPoint. Base's published figures put USDC transfer gas at 46,000 against 125,000 under ERC-4337, a 63.2% reduction, with transaction byte size down 83.4%. September is the target, but no date is confirmed and the implementation is explicitly experimental and unaudited.

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Injective、バイナリオプションの「価格なし返金」経路を突かれ約490万ドル流出——3時間42分の生成停止と、公式説明と第三者分析の食い違い
2026.08.31
Incident
DeFi

Injective loses roughly $4.9M through a binary-options "no price, refund" path — 3h42m without blocks, and a gap between the official account and third-party analysis

On 2026-08-31, Injective mainnet produced no blocks between 16:10:02 UTC and 19:52:14 UTC — three hours, forty-two minutes and twelve seconds — while roughly $4.9 million was extracted through binary-options markets. The attacker is reported to have created a large number of short-lived markets wired to an oracle they controlled, then drawn more than they deposited via the refund path the protocol falls back to when no valid settlement price exists. Injective describes the event as an upgrade rather than a halt; because the emergency release touches core modules, that framing is disputed, and a full post-mortem is still outstanding.

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TAC、ボンド済みステーキングプールが1トランザクションで空に——供給の28.6%が流出し12日超の停止、上流パッチは3日前に配布済みだった
2026.08.22
Incident
Security

TAC's entire bonded staking pool emptied in one transaction — 28.6% of supply gone, twelve days halted, and the upstream patch had shipped three days earlier

On 2026-08-22, an attacker drained 2,985,651,403.40 TAC — 28.6% of supply — from the bonded staking pool of TAC, an EVM-compatible L1 connected to the TON ecosystem, in a single transaction. Block production stopped at 23:58:11 UTC with block 24,671,475. The root cause traces upstream to a mismatch between two balance records in Cosmos EVM: the EVM StateDB tracked only spendable tokens while the Cosmos SDK ledger also held locked vesting tokens that could be delegated, so delegating beyond the spendable amount caused an unchecked subtraction to wrap toward 2^256. The fix had been backported into releases on 19 August, three days before the attack.

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